It should be noted that an additional list of 175 geographical indications will be protected by both parties within four years of the agreement`s entry into force. This commentary deals with how the EU and China reached an agreement 20 years ago, in view of China`s accession to the WTO. Mieke Vanderstraeten studied law in Amsterdam (Netherlands) and acquired an LLM (Lex Legis Magister) in European law from the European College in Bruges (Belgium). She began her career with the Dutch Competition Authority, followed by four years as one of three “referendums” (legal adviser) in the office of the Dutch judge at the Supreme Court of the European Union in Luxembourg. In 2004, she joined the European Commission in Brussels, where she worked in the European Competition Authority. Since 2008, she has been the EU negotiator for an important part of the “Trade in Goods” chapter in the negotiations on EU free trade agreements (FTAs) in Asia (Korea, India, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand, among others, but also with Singapore and Japan). Following the entry into force of the EU`s flagship free trade agreement with Korea, it was also responsible for a significant part of its implementation. Their experience in Asia led them to take a diplomatic post with the EU delegation to China in August 2013. While it has addressed a large number of trade-related issues (for example. B the application of competition in China, high-tech trade, Chinese export credits, SOEs), it currently deals mainly with “investments” and is, as such, part of the negotiating team of the eu-China Investment Agreement, which began in early 2014.
Mieke Vanderstraeten is married and has three daughters. The IAI negotiations aim to create a single legal framework for EU-China investment relations by replacing the 25 outdated bilateral investment agreements (ILOs) concluded by China and EU member states before the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, when the EU acquired the greatest jurisdiction over most investment issues. The AI should go far beyond traditional investment protection and also cover market access, investment-related sustainable development and the same competitive conditions as the transparency of subsidies and rules applicable to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the forced transfer of technology. Beyond strictly bilateral relations, their trade and investment behaviour is also influenced by other external factors related to their global role and their relations with other countries and regional alliances. Among other things, the trade war between the United States and China has certainly played a key role in this regard. Finally, the EU-China agreement on China`s accession to the WTO (19 May 2000) concluded that, although China would maintain the 50-50 ceiling, China would offer a legal guarantee to avoid prudential interference in private contracts between life insurance joint venture partners. China immediately granted seven new licences for European life and life insurers. In addition, insurance activities were opened to foreign companies two years earlier than in China`s China-U.S. WTO accession agreement, and foreign brokers were allowed to operate in China five years after accession, without any joint venture requirement. This would not be the first time that a Sino-Chinese bilateral agreement has hampered efforts between the EU and China to achieve their trade objectives. For example, it took China two years to remove the objections made primarily by the United States (the legitimate right of a third party) to conclude the ue-China agreement on cooperation and protection of geographical indications.
Nor would it be the first time that the EU and the United States have competed for access to financial markets in China.